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Oedipus and the 
Anoedipal Transsexual 
Tamsin Lorraine 
According to at least one version of the Lacanian psychoanalytic account of 
subjectivity, a speaking subject would not be possible if incestuous desire 
were not constrained by the imposition of paternal law. It is only because the 
subject has been able to defer satisfaction of incestuous desire that she or he 
is able to take up a position as a subject who either is or has the phallus. It 
is only by going to one side or the other of the sexual divide that the subject 
is able to organize his or her imaginary anatomy with reference to a privi-
leged body part (the penis) and organize his or her desire in terms of the 
transcendental signifier of desire (the phallus). This is what allows the sub-
ject to separate him- or herself from the world, take up a social position with 
respect to other social subjects, and speak in a coherent and sensible way as 
an "I" who can communicate his or her position to those around her. Thus 
the unconscious is knotted around the secret kernel of incestuous desire that 
is then displaced in the signifying chains that allow that desire to be deferred 
and displaced onto more socially acceptable objects of desire. And it is that 
kernel of desire that will manifest in the symptoms of the unconscious that 
betray the fantasies, dreams, and obsessions the subject is not aware of on a 
conscious level. 
In 1972 the publication in France of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's 
book Anti-Oedipus resonated with the growing challenges to structuralism 
and Lacanian psychoanalysis that arose along with the political upheaval of 
May 1968. In this book they argue that incestuous desire, far from being the 
secret kernel of all desire, is an impoverished form of a nonlacking, produc-
tive desire that participates in the ongoing dance of life, and that human in-
dividuation requires neither an unambiguous separation of the subject from 
other life processes nor the establishment of a stable ego. On their view, the 
3 
4 Tamsin Lorraine 
forms that social repression and subjectivity take shift with changing histori-
cal circumstances; although psychoanalysis helpfully delineates the oedipal 
subject of a capitalist social formation, other, equally viable, forms of sub-
jectivity could emerge in concert with a changing social field. They insist 
upon a notion of the unconscious that emphasizes its productive connec-
tions to the individual's milieu, and they proffer an alternative form of analy-
sis-schizoanalysis--designed to investigate the individual and collective 
flows of desire of specific social formations. 
Rather than promoting a normative form of subjectivity, Deleuze and 
Guattari hope to promote a subjectivity that goes past the limits of oedipal-
ization, simultaneously bringing flows of social desire past the limits of cap-
italism. Capitalism's drive for ever-new sources of profit fosters innovating 
flows of desire that, if left to themselves, could so alter capitalist formations 
that the latter would no longer be capitalist. Oedipalization is a form of so-
cial repression that funnels the productive capacity of the unconscious 
back into the constricting channels of oedipal desire. Following oedipal 
subjectivity to its limits and beyond entails liberating unconscious produc-
tion so that desire can create new realities. Whereas oedipal desire consti-
tutes the subject as lacking the object desired, the goal of anoedipal desire 
is immanent to its process: it seeks not what it lacks but what allows it to 
continue to flow. In order to flow, anoedipal desire must mutate and trans-
form in a self-differentiating unfolding implicated with the social field of 
forces of which it is a part. Schizoanalysis is not meant to represent reality 
without affecting it, but rather to participate as one force among many in the 
creation of reality. The question for Deleuze and Guattari is not whether 
their theory is right or wrong but how effective it is in fostering the creative 
productions of the unconscious. They reject the psychoanalytic contention 
that the only alternative to oedipal subjectivity is psychosis and instead ex-
plore anoedipal flows of desire and the schizo who is a functioning subject 
of such desire. Their notion of the unconscious suggests ways of approach-
ing its "symptoms" that point to possibilities for creative transformation in-
evitably linked with social change. 
In what follows I explore Deleuze and Guattari's alternative conception of 
the unconscious as a productive factory and the schizo subject able to pur-
sue anoedipal desire, and then I consider the particular case of sexual iden-
tity. The fluid identity of the schizo allows a form of transsexuality that many 
have already experienced in one form or other. The experiment a schizoan-
alytic approach to such sexuality makes is to ask what might happen if bi-
nary sexual difference was not the inevitable endpoint of fluxes in sexed 
identity. Considering the case of anoedipal transsexuality challenges con-
ceptions of the unconscious that take the subject as its point of origin and 
presents fascinating possibilities for future forms of subjectivity as well as 
collective forms of living. 
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OEDIPUS AND THE SCHIZO 
Gilbert Simondon, an important influence on Deleuze and Guattari's think-
ing about individuation, argues that the individual has traditionally been de-
fined in terms of a state of stable equilibrium. That is, the individuated being 
is assumed to be in "the sort of equilibrium that is attained in a system when 
all the possible transformations have been achieved and no other force re-
mains to enact any further changes" (Simondon, 1992, p. 302). This approach 
not only excludes the notion of becoming from our thinking about individ-
uation but strips the individual from the interactions with its surrounding mi-
lieu that make it what it is. Simondon suggests understanding the individual 
as a relative reality-"merely the result of a phase in the being's develop-
ment"-instead of a completed totality. Thus individuation could be viewed 
as "a partial and relative resolution manifested in a system that contains la-
tent potentials and harbors a certain incompatibility with itself'' (Simondon, 
1992, p. 300). The tensions arising from the incompatible forces of a specific 
phase of development precipitate the individual into its next phase of de-
velopment. To capture the notion of tension at issue here, the system of the 
individual's reality must be conceived as "replete with potentials" (Simon-
don, 1992, p. 316). It is in part because of the force of potentials in the 
process of becoming that the individual moves from one state of its being to 
another. Individuation entails not a synthesis that finally brings a being into 
a state of completion but, "rather[,] the being passing out of step with itself'' 
(Simondon, 1992, p. 314). Accounts of the subject that attempt to sum up its 
essential attributes fail to capture the shifting movements of its unfolding; 
Simondon's account suggests that any individual is a series of metastable 
states, no one of which captures the essence of what that individual is. 
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze develops a way of understanding 
individuals in terms of the problems inherent in a given process of individu-
ation. Like Simondon, he contends that examining only the final states of 
equilibrium in which a process results (however we may define such states) 
gives us an impoverished understanding of the individual at issue. Individu-
als, including the human subject, would be better understood in terms of a 
self-differentiating series of states comprising virtual potentialities as well as 
material forms that unfold in response to the problems of life. Each state of 
the series is replete with the potential to move into any number of other 
states in concert with its surrounding milieu. The individual subject, on this 
view, is not what remains the same throughout all the changes it undergoes 
but, rather, is a conjunction of states that includes the dynamic force inher-
ent in each state. The states of a process of individuation are not clearly de-
fined but entail the infinitesimal movement of elemental particles toward a 
limit that marks a qualitative change in an open-ended set of particles. This 
limit is the virtual event or singularity that oversees the actualization of the 
6 Tamsin Lorraine 
series; it is the problem insisting in the unfolding of a series of points. For ex-
ample, the point on a vector where water begins to boil is a singularity. That 
singularity inheres in a state of nonboiling water as a virtual possibility. Al-
though it has not yet actually manifested, it insists in that state as a poten-
tiality, a kind of problem that will only be resolved when the incremental 
movements of multiple elements coalesce in a specific way. The singularities 
of freezing and evaporation also inhere in nonboiling water as virtual possi-
bilities. Any one of these singularities only become actualized given the con-
vergence of a whole set of forces that include processes beyond those defin-
ing the individual at issue. The virtualities of boiling, freezing, and evaporating 
constitute part of the incompossible field of virtualities that condition the next 
state the water actually reaches. The entire field of the virtual must ultimately 
include the conditions not just for a given process of individuation but for all 
of life, since all the forces of life ultimately affect one another. Transitions 
across the multiple thresholds involved in a given process of individuation 
happen in infinitesimal degrees that fall below the identities perceived in or-
dinary awareness. The psychic self and coherent body of conscious aware-
ness, from this perspective, are the emergent effects of unstable processes in 
continual movement that unfold over time and entail a field of virtual poten-
tialities as well as the determinate configurations of material elements. 
In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari describe human subjectivity in 
terms of three syntheses of the unconscious: connective syntheses that join 
elements into series ("desiring-machines"), disjunctive syntheses that res-
onate series in metastable states ("bodies without organs"), and conjunctive 
syntheses that gather metastable states into the continuous experience of 
conscious awareness. What Deleuze and Guattari call "desiring-machines" 
are the partial objects of Kleinian psychoanalysis that flow and interrupt 
flow, forming connective syntheses of "then ... and then .... " Primary re-
pression occurs when a determinate configuration of desiring-machines is 
repulsed in a moment of antiproduction that resists any and all determinate 
forms of production. What Deleuze and Guattari call the "body without or-
gans" is the stasis of antiproduction that constitutes a kind of recording sur-
face. The determinate organization of a phase of individuation is implicated 
with the virtual forms it could have been. The body without organs that re-
pulses any determinate form of the working machines of the body distributes 
the disjunctions of "either ... or ... or ... " that include the virtual poten-
tialities of the individual as well as the disjunctions that have been actualized. 
While connective syntheses go from one flow to an interruption in the flow 
to another flow, disjunctive syntheses distribute a network of connective syn-
theses across this recording surface. In the process, the desiring-machines 
come to appear as if they emanate from the body without organs. That is, the 
tension between the working machines of the body and the force of other 
potential configurations of desiring-machines that have not yet been played 
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out bring the individual into a state of equilibrium. The body without organs 
can be seen as a state in which the incompatibilities of the heterogeneous el-
ements of the individual are temporarily resolved. Instead of being the ulti-
mate state of the individual-the essence of who that person is-this state is 
a metastable state that will immediately shift into something else. The con-
junctive syntheses of the unconscious connect the different states of the in-
dividual in terms of the "and ... and ... " of the states through which the in-
dividual mutates. These syntheses constitute "something on the order of a 
subject" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 16). This subject may be, but does not 
necessarily have to be, the oedipal subject described by psychoanalysis. 
Deleuze and Guattari agree with the psychoanalytic account that the co-
herent body-image and sense of self of a sentient subject is the result of a 
mostly unconscious process that unfolds over time. They also agree that 
oedipal subjectivity is one form that human sentience can take. The synthe-
ses they describe, however, have oedipal and anoedipal forms. Schizoanaly-
sis is designed to foster the latter. The subject, as a process of individuation 
emerging from the social field, is an inevitable coparticipant in the creation 
and mutation of social formations. Deleuze and Guattari contend that un-
conscious investments in the social field take precedence over conscious in-
vestments in personal identity. Schizoanalysis, rather than tracing all desire 
to the positions of an oedipal triangle, wants to attain "the immediate pro-
ductive unconscious" that affects and is affected by the breaks and flows of 
the larger social field (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 98). They characterize 
capitalism as a social formation that is a process of individuation compara-
ble to that of any other individual, including the human subject. Thus, capi-
talism also has a body without organs constituting the plateau of anti-
production from which all its concrete manifestations appear to emanate. 
Considering capitalism from this perspective allows us to situate the trajec-
tories of oedipal and schizo subjects' processes of individuation with respect 
to the individuation of the social formation from which they emerge. 
At the level of capitalist society, breaks and flows are created in the desiring-
machines of labor. For example, chocolate is produced in a process that en-
tails breaks and flows of milk, cocoa, and sugar, as well as stirring, pouring, 
and heating. The productive connections of these desiring-machines appear 
to emanate from the body without organs of capitalism when it appears as if 
the production of chocolate is caused by the capital invested in the factory. 
Capital or money is the full body without organs that resists any given de-
terminate form of capitalist society and provides the surface upon which the 
disjunctions of capital are recorded and distributed. Whatever businesses are 
in operation could always be organized differently. Just as the body without 
organs of the individual constitutes a metastable state of partial resolution 
that repulses a given arrangement of desiring-machines, so is what Deleuze 
and Guattari call the "socius" of capitalism a moment of stasis that repulses a 
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given formation of the circulation of money only to unfold into the next for-
mation. Just as the body without organs comes to appropriate a given 
arrangement of desiring-machines by appearing to be its source, so does 
capital come to appropriate a given arrangement of capitalist institutions by 
acting as its quasi cause (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 10). The drive for 
profit is the inherent problem overseeing the capitalist process of produc-
tion, the virtual potentiality toward which a self-differentiating series of states 
tends, that which gives a capitalist formation its mark, even when the spe-
cific form that it takes cannot be predicted in advance. 
Deleuze and Guattari claim that capitalism came into being when "flows 
of production" were decoded in the form of money-capital and "flows of la-
bor" were decoded in the form of the worker free to sell her labor-power. In-
stead of coding (or overcoding) flows of desire, thus making sure that "no 
flow exists that is not properly dammed up, channeled, regulated," capital-
ism "has created an axiomatic of abstract quantities that keeps moving fur-
ther and further in the direction of the deterritorialization of the socius" 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 33). That is, capitalism's emphasis on the ab-
stract quantification of money and labor (what matters is how capital and la-
bor circulates-not the specific form wealth takes or who in particular does 
what) encourages desire to permute across the social field in unpredictable 
ways. Capitalism as a social formation that seeks to replicate itself depends 
on oedipalization to manage this tendency toward deterritorialization. Oedi-
palization entails replacing the connection of partial objects with a regime 
for the pairing of people. "Partial objects now seem to be taken from people, 
rather than from the nonpersonal flows that pass from one person to an-
other. The reason is that persons are derived from abstract quantities, instead 
of from flows" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 71). On the body without or-
gans, desire is the only subject. It passes from one body to another, produc-
ing partial objects, creating breaks and flows, "following connections and 
appropriations that each time destroy the factitious unity of a possessive or 
proprietary ego" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 72). Oedipalization makes it 
appear that partial objects are possessed by a person and that it is the person 
who desires. The exclusive disjunctions of oedipalization designate global 
persons "who do not exist prior to the prohibitions that found them" rather 
than intensive states through which the subject passes on the body without 
organs. The designations of the exclusive disjunctions differentiate among 
global persons and situate the ego vis-a-vis those persons (Deleuze & Guat-
tari, 1983, p. 78). 
The axiomatics of capitalism do not care about preserving the content of 
a given capitalist formation; the specific forms that places of work take with 
the concomitant identities of employers and employees matter much less 
than that capital flows and the market flourishes. For example, the Internet 
and e-commerce are instigating a whole new way of doing business with 
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new roles requiring different ways of thinking about oneself and one's func-
tion in the working whole. Such changes are not only welcomed but re-
quired by capitalism. Yet if capitalism is to replicate itself despite the mutat-
ing forms of the institutions and people who manifest it, it must make sure 
that the deterritorializing flows of capital do not mutate to the point of ren-
dering capitalism unrecognizable to itself. As a process of individuation, cap-
italism passes beyond itself in a series of states of partial resolution that con-
tain incompatibilities and latent potentials. For the tensions in these states 
not to rupture this process entirely (thus ending in capitalism's demise), they 
must be resolved from state to state. Oedipalization is useful to the replica-
tion of capitalism because by making sure desire is always constrained to the 
personalized triangle of oedipus, the inherent deterritorialization of capital-
ism is effectively managed. Despite the radical innovations precipitated by 
the Internet, e-commerce has quickly recuperated its possibilities into busi-
ness as usual. As long as oedipal subjects want to either wield or be the phal-
lus, they identify with the social positions defined by the oedipal triangle, 
and their desires are those relevant to those positions. Oedipal subjects 
maintain the innovations of deterritorializing capital within the tightly bound 
parameters of a personal identity and familial life (or the triangulated au-
thority relationships that mimic oedipus in the public realm). It is Deleuze 
and Guattari's contention that this is precisely the process that psychoanaly-
sis would foster and support. 
Schizoanalysis would encourage capitalism's inherent deterritorialization 
to approach and move past its limit and foster the schizo subject whose de-
sire moves past the constraints of oedipalization. Instead of referring the 
body to a model of totalized body parts referred to a privileged signifier (the 
phallus), the schizo experiences her body as a field of multiplicities vibrating 
in an intensive field with no external point of reference or culmination. Ac-
cording to Deleuze and Guattari, oedipalization constitutes an illegitimate re-
striction on the syntheses of the unconscious because it emphasizes global 
persons (thus excluding all partial objects of desire), exclusive disjunctions 
(thus relegating the subject to a chronological series of moments that can be 
given a coherent narrative account), and a segregative and biunivocal use of 
the conjunctive syntheses (thus reducing the identity of the subject to a co-
herent or static set of one side of a set of oppositions). 
Life itself is an activity of production. Whether a subject is oedipalized or 
not, she is a process in full participation with life as process; the elements of 
her body and psyche are in constant movement, making, disrupting, and re-
making various connections. The conscious awareness of both the oedipal 
subject and the schizo are the emergent effects of myriad processes. But 
while the oedipal subject is subjected to the dominant signifier of the phal-
lus, the schizo is able to experience her surroundings in terms of partial ob-
jects and nonspecific connections, inclusive disjunctions, and nonsegmen-
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tary, polyvocal conjunctions. She still experiences a sense of wholeness, a 
sense that the various states through which she passes are experienced by 
her. But the subject of her experiences is not the global person whose iden-
tity is fixed on either one side or the other of various oppositional divides 
(male or female, white or black), and she designates the various pleasurable 
and painful states through which she passes in terms of intensities that are 
always becoming-other rather than as attributes of an unchanging being. Be-
cause her unconscious productions defy the constriction of oedipalization, 
her reality is different from that of the oedipal subject; her sensations, emo-
tions, and thoughts defy oedipal categorization. The schizo experiences the 
body without organs as a "harrowing, emotionally overwhelming experi-
ence, which brings the schizo as close as possible to matter, to a burning, liv-
ing center of matter" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 19). The schizo who no 
longer designates the states through which she passes in terms of what is 
possible for someone with her personal identity does not stop producing 
connective, disjunctive, and conjunctive syntheses. Thus, she continues to 
produce a form of subjectivity even if it is not an oedipal form, and she con-
tinues to experience life even if her experience defies common sense. But 
while the oedipal subject experiences the world in terms of the possibilities 
posited by dominant reality, the schizo is sensitive to the singularities that 
could produce alternative realities. And, furthermore, given that the schizo 
does not come up against the blank wall of schizophrenia, alcoholism, or 
some other form of a failed or empty body without organs, her production 
of this reality reverberates with and through the realities of others. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, the unconscious neither symbolizes, 
imagines, nor represents but, instead, engineers. Deoedipalization would re-
lease desire from the regulated channels of oedipal desire and allow the cre-
ative proliferation of desiring and social machines. Energy, instead of en-
countering the blank wall of oedipalization, would produce innovative 
forms of subjectivity with different ways of interacting with others and the 
environment and new forms for collective living. Perhaps more importantly, 
these fresh formations would be lived with an intensity and excitement un-
available to oedipalized subjects. Human beings as biological processes im-
mersed in a living world would share in the joyfully creative processes of life 
that always moves onward, generating new forms in response to the mutat-
ing forces of becoming. 
SEXUAL IDENTITY AND DEOEDIPAUZATION 
The sex of an oedipalized subject is consolidated through an arduous 
process that entails subordinating the desiring-machines of the body to the 
phallus as the transcendental signifier of desire. Anoedipal desire that pro-
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duced partial objects by connecting and breaking flows of movement is now 
subordinated to desire associated with totalized persons. Desiring-machines 
are ordered and synchronized in keeping with an ideal referent, and desire 
comes to be associated with lack-the lack of the global person who either 
has a phallus and so wants to satisfy his desire for the prized object or the 
person who does not have a phallus and so wants to be the object of desire. 
It is only thus that a whole set of desiring-machines can come to have one 
sex or the other. But on Deleuze and Guattari's view, this one sex results 
from the statistical domination of either male or female particles. Desiring-
machines-presumably through some kind of analogy to the working parts 
of an ideal man or woman (for Deleuze and Guattari such rigid designation 
of the ultimate ideal is part of an oppressive oedipalization better deterrito-
rialized)-.could be called male or female. Even if one has managed to attain 
the persona of masculinity required by oedipalization of those with a penis, 
such a "man" "at the level of elementary combinations" would have female 
as well as male desiring-machines (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 69). 
According to the exclusive disjuncts of oedipus, subjects are either male 
or female. One cannot be both at once or shift erratically between one and 
the other. But on the view of Deleuze and Guattari, the torturous process of 
stabilizing a sexed identity described by Freudian theory is neither necessary 
nor desirable. Yes, oedipalization requires that we commit to one side or the 
other of the sexual divide; but on their view this entails an illegitimate use of 
the syntheses of the unconscious. It is through the unconscious syntheses 
that the fluxing processes of our body constitute a kind of whole. This whole 
is not the totalized whole posited by oedipalization with reference to the 
phallus but, rather, a whole that neither unifies nor totalizes the parts of the 
body "though it has an effect on these other parts simply because it estab-
lishes aberrant paths of communication between noncommunicating ves-
sels, transverse unities between elements that retain all their differences 
within their own particular boundaries" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 43). 
That is, metastable states of partial resolution distribute desiring-machines on 
a plane that resonates with the force of virtual possibilities, most of which 
will never come to pass. The body without organs renders the body whole 
by establishing "aberrant paths" of communication among shifting desiring-
machines rather than by integrating the desiring-machines into an organic 
whole where each part has a stabilized place and position vis-a-vis the other 
parts. 
Deleuze and Guattari say that the schizo is transsexual (as well as "trans-
alivedead," "trans-parentchild"). Her sexual identity is not confined to the ex-
clusive binary of female or male (thus the pronoun she is used here only for 
the sake of convenience). She inhabits a space where her proper name no 
longer designates a person but, rather, "singularities flocking from all sides, 
evanescent agents of production" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 77). The 
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anoedipal transsexual is a faceless, transpositional subject who does not 
have to blunt the differences among the positions she takes up because no 
attempt is made to consolidate her identity into one final state that includes 
all the actualized attributes of her previous states. Instead, she is a conjunc-
tion of metastable states-states that distribute specific configurations of par-
tial objects and virtualities and are then joined into an incompossible whole. 
Her proper name doesn't represent her but, rather, designates a class of ef-
fects within fields of potentials (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 86). This sub-
ject, rather than the effect of exclusions, is the effect of modifications that 
pass through all possible predicates in an "inclusive disjunction that carries 
out the synthesis itself in drifting from one term to another and following the 
distance between terms" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 77). The series con-
stituting the desiring-machines of connective syntheses are distributed in the 
disjunctive network of the body without organs, and the states through 
which a transpositional subject passes are experienced as intensive states in 
the conjunctive syntheses. But the resulting "me" "is merely the residual sub-
ject that sweeps the circle and concludes a self from its oscillations on the cir-
cle" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 88). Such a subject has no difficulty in 
moving from a state identified as "female" to one identified as "male"; she is 
able to uphold the differences between the terms because she can shift so 
easily from one modification to the other without excluding either one. 
One might say that psychoanalysis performs a service for those made mis-
erable about being unable to find a place for themselves within the collec-
tive structures of capitalism. But to do this, psychoanalysis posits a notion of 
the unconscious that assumes that for a subject to be possible, a certain price 
must be exacted. The sacrificial logic that suggests that any socialized sub-
ject must sacrifice a portion of his desires and accept his lack in order to take 
up the mantle of selfhood is, according to Deleuze and Guattari, a product 
of capitalism. Anoedipal desire is fully productive, and the schizo's identity, 
inherently nonlacking. The anoedipal transsexual does not share the anxi-
eties about identity of the oedipal subject. Her most secret desire can not be 
represented in terms of persons: she does not want to kill her father and 
sleep with her mother or sleep with her father and kill her mother. She does 
not long to possess a mother-substitute that proves she has the phallus or 
win the favor of the father-substitute in order to prove she is the phallus. In-
stead she is a resonating field of intensities hungry for connection with other 
intensities. Furthermore, her identity is not the result of a process of imagi-
nary displacements from the distribution of positions allowed by oedipal tri-
angulation. Her identities range freely across the entire social field. Whereas 
oedipalization (and psychoanalysis) suggests that the only option to oedi-
palization is psychosis, Deleuze and Guattari contend that it is the process of 
oedipaliziltion itself that has created the false dichotomy between a con-
strained personal identity with its truncated unconscious and the terrifying 
abyss of a complete lack of identity. 
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For the transsexual able to thwart oedipalization and allow her desiring-
production to exceed the constraints of daddy-mommy-and-me, sexual iden-
tity is liberated from the illegitimate syntheses of the unconscious; connec-
tions and disconnections are made without regard for persons, identities 
incompatible with the oedipalized position of the subject are not excluded, 
and the pleasures and pains experienced by the subject are not constrained 
to those of one who feels and wants only what is not excluded by her 
membership in a particular set of compossible identities. Thus, her desiring-
machines produce an anoedipal reality; partial objects are created in the im-
manent unfolding of connections created without reference to global per-
sons. Instead of referring her identity to a totalized ideal in comparison with 
which she must inevitably be lacking, she easily shifts identities. She lets 
each state go and the next state come without worrying about whether the 
state she is experiencing is appropriate for the consolidation of a substantial 
self that she is supposed to be. Because the codes she uses to designate her 
states are not subordinated to a transcendental signifier, they shift and mu-
tate in keeping with the circumstances of the moment. She can identify as 
her own son or father, the king of Siam, or the nomadic hordes descending 
from the steppes. It is not that she has lost touch with reality; to believe that 
she is the king of Siam is to assume that as a totalized whole she can be rep-
resented as being like an ideal referent. Rather, she designates her state as a 
set of effects within a field of potentials in the way that physicists have des-
ignated the effects of varying relationships (e.g., of heat, power, and work) 
with the name of the physicist who determined a law of interaction (e.g., the 
Joule effect or the Kelvin effect)-a configuration of relations comparable to 
(rather than identical with) other such configurations generates comparable 
effects (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 86). 
The anoedipal transsexual does not believe in representations because 
she does not believe in totalized wholes. She is neither saying that she es-
sentially is the king of Siam, nor is she saying that she is metaphorically like 
the king of Siam. The myriad processes constituting her construct a body 
without organs of material elements in determinate configurations and vir-
tual potentialities that include linguistic as well as organic processes. In iden-
tifying with the king of Siam she is not representing a totalized self but, 
rather, experiencing an intensive state in which dynamic potential inheres in 
the sense of the words she uses as well as in the configuration of elements 
of her physical state. That is, her words play a constitutive role in the inten-
sive state she experiences. The different states through which she passes are 
continuous fields of intensity that are always becoming-other. The pleasures 
and pains she consumes in the conjunctive syntheses in which she experi-
ences a self-differentiating series of states as her own are not confined to 
those that can be referred to a consolidated oedipal position. Instead she 
shifts through a wide range of states, experiencing the incompossible plea-
sures and pains of a fractured subject. The proper name she may attach to all 
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the series she experiences designates an accumulation of specific effects 
rather than any one essence. The pieces of the world she experiences can-
not be integrated into one organic whole because its spatial and temporal co-
ordinates are ruptured in a proliferation of incommensurate viewpoints. 
Thus her narratives are splintered, her sense of time and place is skewed, 
and her experience is akin to the refracted dimensions of a cubist painting. 
The erotic possibilities of the anoedipal transsexual are immense. Her per-
ceptions are sensitive to the singularities of processes normally excluded 
from the disjunctions tolerated by oedipal subjectivity. Her desire unfolds ac-
cording to the problems inherent to unique encounters. She sees a lizard 
scuttling along in front of her on a rocky trail. She wonders what it feels like 
to have reptilian skin, a long tail, to move so closely to the ground. She is a 
becoming-lizard as she crouches slightly and slinks smoothly along the path, 
feeling the sun beating down on her back, the heat rising up from the rocks 
around her. Later, when she gets into her car to drive home, she feels the 
steering wheel reverberate under her hands. She is a becoming-car as she 
swerves around corners, speeds along the open road. The problem becomes 
not how to move under the sun but how to keep wheels on pavement as 
one's weight is shifted with centrifugal force. When she gets home, she 
greets her lover. She is a becoming-other as she feels her lover's heart beat 
against her breast, senses the stiffness in the embrace, the slight dampness 
of arms wrapped around her. Her lover is a becoming-catatonic. She res-
onates with intensities that manifest stimulus-overload. The problem be-
comes how to ward off further stimulus. She is a becoming-catatonic too. 
But her lover is also responding to her, and becomes-lizard and car, and 
then is a becoming-less-catatonic. The problem shifts, what is the point of 
intersection in their becoming-one? The anoedipal transsexual has no need 
to reference these encounters to a substantial self grounded with respect to 
oedipal relations. Her identities wander from state to state and designation 
to designation. She has no need to exclude her identities of lizard, car, or 
catatonic because there's no need to organize her experiences with respect 
to a circumscribed set of identities ( woman, daughter, and lover; professor, 
citizen, and neighbor). She is free to drift from one identity to the next, par-
taking of the perceptions, emotions, and thoughts available to all her in-
compossible identities. 
Of course, it is hard to imagine how the schizo could survive in our cul-
ture. In fact, we can each point to examples of strange people who do not 
quite "fit" and may suffer greatly as a result; even those comfortable with 
fluctuating identities are often forced by the discomfort of those around 
them to conform to a more acceptable set of identity constraints. But 
Deleuze and Guattari search for a different "cure" than that of enabling the 
analysand to perfect a process of oedipalization that has gone awry. Their 
intent is to promote the tendencies toward deoedipalization already pres-
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ent, push them to their limits, and, thus, support the creation of a social 
formation able to support subjects of a completely different kind. Thus, "it is 
not the purpose of schizonalysis to resolve Oedipus" but, rather, to explore 
various relationships between psychic and social repression, desiring-
machines and specific social formations, and to consider how to foster the 
creative productions of unconscious desire (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 
81). Deleuze and Guattari are quick to grant that the experiments pro-
moted by schizoanalysis can be dangerous. There are reactionary as well 
as revolutionary unconscious investments of desire (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1983, p. 105). Revolutionary groups can and will become fascist, schizos 
will go psychotic, catatonic, or reterritorialize onto neurosis. It is because 
the productions of the unconscious meet the blank wall of an oedipalizing 
capitalism that schizophrenia as a painful and unfortunate clinical disease 
occurs. Subjects need to be able to connect with the larger social flows 
around them. Being walled into their own intensities leads to an empty 
body without organs that is a kind of living death. For the schizo to survive 
as a nomadic subject she must make connections with other schizos. She 
must make working desiring-machines with her surrounding environment 
and with others that transmit fluxes and flows along lines of flight that ex-
tend beyond herself to ripple across the social field. It is only when she has 
affected and been affected by others that she can become part of a rever-
berating, resonating field of intensities and her body without organs can 
connect with the bodies without organs of others to create a plateau reso-
nant with new possibilities. Schizoanalysis cannot simply foster the anoedi-
pal desiring-production of a subject's unconscious, it must also foster pro-
ductive connections of that desiring-production to the desiring-production 
of others and the world. 
Thus, schizoanalysis can never simply analyze an individual; the individ-
ual must always be analyzed as a porously responsive and responding mul-
tiplicity that changes and mutates in keeping with the multiplicities sur-
rounding and running through her. The time and space of such a subject is 
as fractured as her identity. In her free-floating associations with the world 
(none of which she truly believes) her time becomes the virtual totality of all 
time and her space becomes the virtual totality of all space. The unconscious 
of such a subject cannot be construed as the black box of any one psyche; it 
occupies the impossible time and space of incompossible perspectives and 
incorporeal virtualities as well as the actualized forms of material processes. 
Each one of the states through which the subject passes may actualize a spe-
cific time and space according to standard chronologies and topologies, but 
on this view consciousness is no more than the emergent effect of uncon-
scious forces that ultimately coincide with the chaos of the cosmos, the tran-
scendental field of the virtual as the dynamic force experienced by any given 
subject in terms of concrete actualizations. In the cosmic scheme of things, 
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everything that is is linked by the transcendental field of the virtual that is the 
condition of any actualization. The unconscious of the individual ultimately 
expands to include this transcendental field while the concrete experiences 
of the individual is the angle(s) or perspective(s) refracting that virtual field 
in an actualized set of experiences. 
Nietzsche describes the arduous process human beings had to undergo in 
order to get to the point where they could make promises they could keep 
(cf. Deleuze, 1983, p. 134). It is this ability to make promises that allows a 
culture of forward-looking memory where what matters is not that everyone 
has the same repertoire of memories of the past, but rather that everyone is 
able to make a pledge to the future. The schizo and the society of schizos 
that would bring deterritorialization along with capitalism past its limit would 
not root their common ground in carefully homogenized recollections and 
narratives of the past but would rather deliberately foster the cacophonous 
explosion of incompossible creations drawn from the virtual totality of time 
in ever-differing ways. Instead of demanding a coherent self with a past nar-
rated in keeping with a standardized chronology and played out in a space 
carefully coordinated with respect to the space of all other admissible sub-
jects, the new society of schizos would pledge themselves only to a promise 
of collective living. This promise would constitute a commitment not to the 
shapes and forms of the past or present moment but to the ongoing inter-
connections that would be honored and maintained despite all the transfor-
mations to come. Such a commitment would depend on a continuous flight 
from rigidifying forms in keeping with unconscious desire in its immanent 
production of working machines. Rather than the narcissistic pursuit of per-
sonal gratification, such unfolding could only occur in the attunement of a 
collective of schizos openly responsive to the transforming affects of others 
as well as fully engaged in transformative activity of their own. It is only in 
the commitment to the eternal return of a collective becoming-other that the 
unconscious as the vibrant force of creative evolution could unfold in a joy-
ous dance of communion. 
There are obvious risks with such a vision. Even those with already man-
ifest tendencies toward anoedipal transsexuality may fear the explosive re-
sults of a whole society of transsexuals. Deleuze and Guattari's celebration 
of the schizo entails a deep belief in the creative productivity of the human 
unconscious as well as of life itself. Life processes will always entail the sta-
bilization of patterns of living as well as the creation of new forms. For 
Deleuze and Guattari, it can only be to our benefit to attend ever more 
closely to the pulse of the living rather than become fixated on past cre-
ations. Capitalism as a social formation is already reaching the limit point 
where it will be precipitated into a qualitatively different state. It is up to us 
to be full participants in the creation of our next incarnation. 
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